Mental illness, human function and values by Megone, C.
Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values
Megone, Christopher.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Volume 7, Number 1, March
2000, pp. 45-65 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
For additional information about this article
                                                        Access Provided by Open University at 07/05/11  1:52PM GMT
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ppp/summary/v007/7.1megone.html
MEGONE / MENTAL ILLNESS, HUMAN FUNCTION, AND VALUES  45
© 2000 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Christopher Megone
Mental Illness,
Human Function,
 and Values
ABSTRACT: The present paper constitutes a development
of the position that illness, whether bodily or mental,
should be analyzed as an incapacitating failure of bodily
or mental capacities, respectively, to realize their func-
tions. The paper undertakes this development by re-
sponding to two critics. It addresses first Szasz’s con-
tinued claims that (1) physical illness is the paradigm
concept of illness and (2) a philosophical analysis of
mental illness does not shed any light on the social and
legal role of the idea. Then, in reply to Wakefield, the
aim is to defend the account as an interpretation of
Aristotle and to argue that this Aristotelian view of
mental illness is preferable to one that rests on a sup-
posed value free account of human function. More
generally the discussion points to the fact that both
Wakefield and Szasz rely on a number of metaphysical
assumptions about the supposedly empirical nature of
medical diagnosis, about the relation between facts
and values, and about mind and body (among others),
which are open to challenge. In particular the paper
indicates an Aristotelian approach to the fusion, in the
natural world, of so-called facts and values, and the
relevance of this fusion to the analysis of the concept of
illness. This suggests the debate over distinct concep-
tions of that concept must both illumine and be illumi-
nated by these deeper metaphysical questions.
KEYWORDS: fact, nature, physical illness, rationality,
teleological explanation
IAM MOST GRATEFUL for the work of ProfessorWakefield and Professor Szasz, as well asthat of previous commentators, in response
to my paper on Aristotle’s function argument
and mental illness. The debate here emphasizes
the value of the cross-fertilization made possible
by a journal such as Philosophy, Psychiatry, &
Psychology, and the need for such a journal. In
the present case, my fellow contributors are both
much better qualified than I in the psychiatric
field, and this is of benefit to my work. However,
from my perspective, both seem unduly incau-
tious in some of their philosophical claims, which
may leave scope for my contribution. Although
adopting very different positions, both Wakefield
and Szasz seem to rely on some doubtful general
assumptions. In Szasz’s case one might cite an
apparent adherence to Cartesian dualism about
mind and body, and assumptions about meaning
and definition, and method in establishing these.
In Wakefield one might note implicit views as to
a theory of explanation and about the nature of
essentialism. Finally both hold views about the
supposedly empirical nature of medical diagno-
sis, about values, and about the relation between
facts and values, which require scrutiny.
The aim of this paper is to respond to the
charges made against my position by Szasz and
Wakefield. However, in so doing, it should also
be possible to illuminate, and question, the role
played by assumptions of the sort mentioned
above. More positively still, the paper should
indicate, at least, the way in which an Aristote-
lian account of the natural world fuses so-called
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facts and values (the terms are not Aristotelian)
and also the way in which an analysis of the
concepts of illness and health illustrates the ad-
vantages of such an account.
In this first section the charges made against
my Aristotelian account will be outlined and an
indication of the response will be given. The
second section will examine further Szasz’s claims
about the concept of physical illness. Since Szasz
surprisingly admits in this discussion that in his
view the concept of physical illness refers to
functional norms, this introduces the question of
the role of functional norms in an analysis of the
concept of illness. The third section provides a
clarification of the Aristotelian account previ-
ously presented, responding to a range of criti-
cisms made by Wakefield. In the fourth section,
Wakefield’s unusual conception of teleological
explanation and his proposed alternative account
of natural function will be rebutted. These third
and fourth sections provide space for an indica-
tion of the fact/value relation in the Aristotelian
approach. In the fifth section, in response to
Szasz’s charge, the importance of the philosophi-
cal analysis of the concept of mental illness for
the social and legal use of that concept will be
considered. Finally a way forward for develop-
ing the Aristotelian account of the concept of
mental illness is briefly sketched and the joint
role of philosophy and psychiatry in such a project
is indicated.
What then are the claims that must be ad-
dressed? Szasz holds that the Aristotelian posi-
tion put forward has not refuted his argument
that the concept of mental illness lacks literal
meaning and that the concept of physical illness
is the paradigm concept of illness (Szasz 2000).
Furthermore he continues to assert that a philo-
sophical analysis of mental illness is irrelevant to
understanding the social and legal role of the
idea, which is what most requires attention (ibid.).
Wakefield, on the other hand, claims that the
interpretation given of Aristotle’s function argu-
ment (which he takes to be a misinterpretation)
in effect holds that judgments about mental dis-
order (illness) are essentially value judgments,
and thus is a position “on the same side as Szasz
with respect to the most important issues”
(Wakefield 2000, 42). In Wakefield’s view, this
undesirable state of affairs can be remedied by
providing a value-free account of natural (hu-
man) functions (an account he seems to attribute
to Aristotle), which can then constitute a non-
evaluative component in an analysis of mental
disorder.
In response to Szasz’s first claim above, it may
be helpful at the outset to indicate the structure
of the argument previously deployed against his
first point. Szasz has asserted that physical illness
is the paradigm concept of illness. This seems to
imply that the meaning of this concept is clear
and undisputed. The first stage of the reply (1)
simply followed Fulford and others in noting that
the literature does not reveal a clear and well
understood concept of physical illness (Fulford
1991, 80–81; 1998, 216). Given this, there is no
reason to give that concept a privileged status.
(2) By contrast, since both mental and physical
illnesses are widely believed to exist, an account
of the concept of illness revealing the two con-
cepts to have something in common (though
also, of course, differences) has considerable pre-
theoretical plausibility. (3) An Aristotelian func-
tional account adequately achieves this objective
and also captures the evaluative connotations of
the concept of illness. (4) Such a functional ac-
count also gives rise to an account of mental
illness that can explain two phenomena, the abuse
of psychiatric power and the misuse of drugs in
treating mental illness, that any adequate ac-
count should explain. Therefore (5) such an ac-
count of illness is to be preferred to one based on
the contentious (and supposedly purely physi-
ological) account put forward by Szasz. If, as
argued, all these stages are correct, this is a
refutation of Szasz’s claim that the concept of
physical illness alone has literal meaning.
In his current discussion, Szasz has taken up
stage 1 of the argument above by reasserting the
paradigm position of the concept of physical
illness, so that claim is reexamined, in some de-
tail, below.1 In response to Wakefield, it will be
argued that he has radically misconstrued both
Aristotle and my account of Aristotle. It will also
be shown that a non-evaluative account of natu-
ral functions is implausible but that, in any case,
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the Aristotelian account of natural function or of
illness should not be construed as purely evalua-
tive. There is a false contrast here. The falsity of
this contrast may undercut Wakefield’s own mo-
tivation for a non-evaluative account, which
seems tied to his conception of science as a purely
empirical enterprise. As will then be seen, apart
from the conceptual problems with his account,
it faces difficulties both in explaining the reason
for a link between the concept of dysfunction
and that of disorder, and in accounting for the
source of judgments of harm that contributes to
judgments of disorder. Taken together, these last
points may suggest that Wakefield’s own posi-
tion is closer to Szasz’s than he would like.
The Concept of Physical
Illness
In response to the Aristotelian claim that the
concept of mental illness has as literal a meaning
as the concept of physical illness, Szasz reiterates
his view that physical disease is the basic notion,
clear and undisputed. In defense of this view, he
cites the definition of disease given in the Oxford
English Dictionary, two pathology textbooks that
agree that “the basis of all disease is injury to the
smallest living unit of the body, namely, the cell,”
and the fact that textbooks of pathology do not
cite clinical depression or schizophrenia as dis-
eases. In summary, he asserts that the core medi-
cal conception of disease is as a bodily abnor-
mality (Szasz 2000, 4).2 Given this assertion,
Szasz’s next move is as follows: “Extending the
criterion of disease from malfunctions of the
body to malfunctions of the human mind intro-
duces a fatal infection into the materialist medi-
cal definition of disease. The mind is not a mate-
rial object; hence it can be diseased only in a
metaphorical sense” (ibid.). Thus his traditional
view is reasserted.
However, there are several points to make in
reply. First of all, Szasz’s second move transpar-
ently depends on an unstated premise, some form
of Cartesian dualism about the mind. Thus any
non-Cartesian need not accept this claim. Cer-
tainly an Aristotelian account of the mind (which
is not reductionist, incidentally) rejects outright
this Cartesian framework, and the conceptions
of physical substance and mental substance un-
derlying it. The Aristotelian account denies that
the criterion for bodily illness is purely physical
(or, for that matter, purely psychological) in that
it appeals to norms that are not purely physi-
ological. So the Aristotelian account of illness
does not extend the application of a criterion
from the physical to the mental. It simply applies
the same criterion (which is not reducible to
physiological terms) to both types of illness.
But consider now Szasz’s initial claim. First of
all, Szasz simply ignores the fact observed by
Fulford that those who have attempted to define
physical illness have not been able to provide a
satisfactory definition (Fulford 1991, 80–81;
Boorse 1975; Kendell 1975). Thus he avoids the
tricky question of how this fact is to be recon-
ciled with his evidence. Secondly, he does not ask
himself whether any of the sources he cites are
purporting to reveal the literal meaning of the
concept of physical illness. Both these points
raise the issue of what is being sought in a search
for the literal meaning of a term and how one
gets at it. Thus Fulford’s point is that a range of
definitions of physical illness have been put for-
ward, several inconsistent with that offered in
Szasz’s pathology textbooks. Given this, it is not
clear why the latter should be given authority.
Thus, it might be queried whether Szasz’s
sources are the right place, or the only place, to
look for the literal meaning of a term. In the case
of a dictionary or pathology textbook, what is
being reported could well reflect only current
usage (or medical usage), which may be con-
fused, or at least not concerned to spell out the
term’s literal meaning. If so, one might suppose,
in technical terms, that these sources are only
giving the nominal definition of the term, an
account of how the word is currently used, which
could well be incomplete or even contain con-
flicts. In contrast one might argue that the literal
meaning is given by the term’s real definition,
and this should be an account that fully articu-
lates the terms’ meaning, explaining ordinary
usage so far as is possible and accounting for any
incompleteness or conflicts there. Thus Szasz
needs to be more reflective on philosophical
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method, more cautious as to what’s involved in
giving the literal meaning of a term.
This problem with method leads to a third
more crucial point, for it transpires that Szasz’s
own proposed literal meaning is indeed incom-
pletely spelled out and in a way that is problem-
atic for his position. On the basis of the pathol-
ogy textbooks, Szasz claims that the core medical
conception of physical illness is that of bodily
abnormality. This account of the concept is com-
pressed because it does not identify the source of
the norms by reference to which abnormalities
are to be picked out. What makes a particular
condition of cells an abnormality? Such a literal
meaning is therefore incomplete and crucially
unclear. As a result, even if we allow Szasz to rely
in this way on his pathology textbooks, the mean-
ing of disease given there cannot be assumed to
be irreducibly materialist (as he assumes in mak-
ing his second claim noted above).
This point can be developed by putting it
together with further remarks made by Szasz. He
claims that I attributed to him the absurd view
that the meaning of the concept of mental illness
could be given “without incorporating any evalu-
ative term” (Szasz’s italics). By contrast he now
states “that the concept of disease contains an
evaluative element is self-evident. . . . The crucial
difference between lesion qua bodily disease and
behavior qua mental disease is not that one is a
value-free biological fact and the other a value-
laden social construct. Both are value-laden so-
cial constructs. . . . The crucial difference between
bodily disease and mental disease is that what
counts as a somatic pathology is based on a
judgment of how the body ought to function,
whereas what counts as psychopathology is based
on a judgment of how the person ought to func-
tion” (Szasz 2000, 9).
This statement requires careful consideration
before we can return to the purported definition
bodily abnormality. The first point is that, in my
original paper, the reason for attributing to Szasz
the claim that the meaning of physical illness can
be given without incorporating any evaluative
terms was his assertion that “what (physical)
health is can be stated in physiological and ana-
tomical terms” (Szasz 1960, 114, 116; Macklin
1973). Szasz seems now unaware that the claim
that a criterion of bodily disease appeals to a
norm of bodily functioning is incompatible with
this earlier claim. What can be stated in physi-
ological and anatomical terms is the physiologi-
cal/anatomical condition of a being. This materi-
alistic language does not have the resources for
the language of norms, which must state whether
that physiological condition is enabling the body
to achieve some goal or purpose, some good. For
reasons given below, it is very welcome that
Szasz accepts the importance of norms of func-
tioning in the definition of illness. However, it is
important to see that this acceptance now reveals
Szasz himself to be unclear as to the definition of
physical illness. (Note also that the above state-
ment about norms appears to conflict with his
appeal to “an objectively identifiable biological
norm” in a previous reply (Szasz 1998, 204).
The second point on this issue is that Szasz’s
remarks presuppose that the norms that govern
how the body ought to function are distinct from
the norms that govern how the person ought to
function. If he accepts that the human body is a
component of the human person, he is thus pre-
supposing that one can determine the function of
a part independently of determining the function
of a whole. This is a highly contentious claim,
for which he gives no defense. In fact it is ex-
tremely implausible that norms for the function
of parts are distinct from norms for the function-
ing of the whole, as a consideration of artifacts
will show. This will be discussed further below.
Recalling Szasz’s earlier claim that the literal
meaning of physical illness is bodily abnormal-
ity, two points are now clear. The most basic of
these is that Szasz’s preferred account of the
literal meaning of bodily illness is incomplete
and unclear. It has to be spelled out in relation to
norms, and that in turn raises the question of the
specification of those norms. So far as this is
concerned, Szasz has left it unclear, in the case of
physical illness, how it is to be determined in
what way the body ought to function. However,
in so doing, he has left open the possibility that
the ultimate determinant of the norm of bodily
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function is the same as the determinant of the
norm of functioning of the whole person, since
in general the function of parts will depend on
the function of the whole. This would of course
be compatible with the Aristotelian picture in
which the evaluative norms for both physical
and mental illness are the same. The second point
is that in conceding the relevance of norms to the
definition of both physical and mental illness,
Szasz has thereby conceded that the literal mean-
ing of physical disease, the body failing to func-
tion as it ought to function, cannot be given in
purely materialistic language since such language
does not include the notion of goals/purposes/
goods that must be used to characterize norms.
So far as Szasz is concerned then, the result of
the discussion above is a vindication of the first
claim of my original argument. There is no rea-
son to treat the concept of physical illness as the
paradigm concept of illness since it is neither
clear nor undisputed. Szasz’s own favored ac-
count is not complete since the norms of bodily
functioning that are part of the definition have
not been specified. Furthermore the account is
not clear because it now conflicts with some of
Szasz’s previous own claims, since the relevance
of norms to the definition prevents it being speci-
fied in purely material language. (Both these
points leave open the possibility that the norms
specified in the meaning of physical illness are, at
some level, the same as those for mental illness.)
Szasz’s admission of the importance of evalua-
tive norms of functioning for the definition of
illness, whether bodily or mental, constitutes a
useful introduction to the discussion of Wakefield,
since Wakefield’s position admits the relevance
of the concept of natural functioning to an analy-
sis of the concept of mental illness but denies
that the notion of natural function is itself to be
understood normatively, that is, evaluatively (thus
conflicting now with both Szasz and myself).
Natural Functions
The position presented in my original paper
was that illness, whether bodily or mental, should
be analyzed as an incapacitating failure of bodily
or mental capacities, respectively, to realize their
functions. It was suggested that the notion of
function here should be understood as Aristotle
had understood it (incorporating, in modern
terms, an evaluative component): Human beings
have a function in the sense that there are goals
or purposes that good human beings will realize
(actualize). The Aristotelian claim is that the
ultimate goal for a good human being as a whole
is to live the life of a fully rational animal. The
function of the bodily and mental parts of a
human is to operate in ways that contribute
instrumentally or constitutively to the realiza-
tion of this goal. Thus a bodily ailment such as a
lung condition is, at root, an incapacitating fail-
ure of the lung to function in that way whereby it
contributes optimally to the life of the fully ratio-
nal animal; a mental illness such as depression
will involve an incapacitating failure of mental
powers to be realized (actualized), thus prevent-
ing the individual reasoning optimally.
Wakefield’s argument against this position has
several strands. He claims that it provides an
incorrect analysis of (dys)function. He also claims
that it rests on a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s
function argument. In place of these supposed
errors, Wakefield offers his own analysis of the
notion of function, and of its role in the concept
of mental illness, and he argues that such an
account can be based on the Aristotelian function
argument, properly interpreted. According to
Wakefield, the notion of a human natural function
should be understood non-evaluatively, though
still in terms of those aspects of human behavior
that can be teleologically explained. Thus the
appeal to teleological explanation here purport-
edly requires no appeal to values. This requires a
novel account of teleological explanation.
Before replying to these arguments, I will clarify
my account of Aristotle’s function argument, since
it has been misconstrued by Wakefield. I argue
that the notion of function is related to a concep-
tion of teleological explanation that entails an
evaluative or normative framework. To explain
how Aristotle’s preferred conception of function
is identified in the human case, I will indicate the
way in which the Aristotelian account fuses facts
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and values. I will then argue that an alternative
account of teleological explanation is not needed
and is not coherent.
A version of Aristotle’s function argument is
presented in Nicomachean Ethics I.7, though a
further version is also given in Eudemian Ethics
II.1, and relevant remarks are made in Politics
I.1–3. Wakefield makes a number of objections to
the interpretation previously given of the NE ar-
gument. (1) He holds that “Megone’s interpreta-
tion turns Aristotle’s claim into a triviality” (2000,
24) because the interpretation results only in claims
that are true in a trivial sense. (2) The argument as
I interpreted it tells the modern reader nothing
about why it makes sense for reason to be the
function of a human being (Wakefield 2000). (3)
The account given does not adequately explain
the references in the argument to the functions of
flautists and carpenters (Wakefield 2000; Hobbs
1998, 211). (4) The proposed analysis of human
function collapses the notion into that of the hu-
man good and thus makes the investigation of the
human good in terms of function unhelpfully cir-
cular (ibid.).
At least three of these claims turn on misinter-
pretations by Wakefield. To see this, and to re-
view the interpretation, it is necessary first to
recall the bare bones of the argument in NE I.7.
Aristotle argues first that there is a quite general
connection between the function of a kind and
the good of that kind. To support this point, he
gives the examples of musicians and sculptors
whose good, qua musicians and sculptors, is tied
to the function of each skill. Given this general
claim, if humans qua humans have a function,
that will determine their good too. Aristotle then
cites two considerations in favor of the view that
humans as such have a function. First he suggests
that if carpenters and tanners have a function, then
humans as such should do also; and second, he
notes that since eyes and feet have functions, the
human being as a whole must do so (NE I.7,
1097b31ff.). His third point is that whatever the
human function is, it must be distinct from that of
plants and animals. And finally he concludes that
the human function is realized in “an active life of
the element that has a rational principle” (NE I.7,
1098a5ff.). It is the life of a fully rational animal.
Clearly this argument turns crucially on the
claim that humans as such have a function but
also on Aristotle’s view of what that function is.
On my interpretation, in order to understand the
crucial first claim, we need to attend to Aristotle’s
views on natural kinds in general, which can
then be applied to the case of humans (Megone
1998a, 192–94). However, according to Wakefield,
in the presentation of this interpretation, func-
tion is defined in a way that renders the whole
argument trivially uninteresting.
Wakefield’s argument for this claim is curious.
He seems to think that my interpretation rests on
starting from a definition of the function of a
part and then applying that definition to derive
the function of the whole. Such an account would
in fact run contrary to an Aristotelian principle
indirectly referred to in my original interpreta-
tion, namely, that parts have functions only in so
far as wholes have functions; that is, the function
of the whole is the prior notion. But it is also a
mistake to think the notion of function is defined
primarily with reference to either part or whole.
Wakefield gives the basis for his position as fol-
lows.
(1) Megone construes Aristotle as arguing “that if
parts of a human, such as the eye or the foot, have a
function then a human being as a whole must do so”
(Megone 1998a, 192). That is, he suggests that it is
conceptually necessary for the whole organism to have
a function if a part does. . . . (2) Recall that Megone
defines a part’s function as whatever the part contrib-
utes to the life cycle changes of a good member of the
species. Thus, he thinks that “[f]unctional explana-
tion only makes sense in the light of the function of
the whole” (195) because each function by definition
must contribute to the organism’s overall functioning.
(3) Indeed, if one mechanically applies Megone’s defi-
nition of function to the whole organism rather than
to a part, one finds that the function of the organism
is whatever the organism contributes to the character-
istic life of the organism, which is everything! (Wake-
field 2000, 23).
As indicated already, there are two basic prob-
lems here: One concerning the definition of func-
tion, the other concerning the relation of parts
and wholes. Take attribution 1 first. At no point
was it suggested that it is conceptually necessary
for the whole organism to have a function if a
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part does. In fact the idea that a claim about the
whole organism is conceptually dependent on a
claim about the parts gets things just the wrong
way round and gives a contentious account of
the mode of argument. On the contrary, Aristotle’s
suggestion (not an explicit argument) (NE.I.7,
1097b32–33), that if the eye or foot has a func-
tion, then the whole human must do so, is based
on a suppressed general principle that parts can
only have functions if they belong to wholes that
have a function. According to this principle, the
functions of wholes are prior to the functions of
parts. Given such a general principle and the fact
that we pre-theoretically believe that eyes, for
example, do have functions, namely, to see, we
are driven to accepting that human beings as
such have a function.
The basis for the general principle on which
the argument depends was not indicated in the
previous paper, but it is certainly asserted by
Aristotle and looks like a metaphysical claim
about the nature of parts and wholes, not a
conceptual claim.
We may now proceed to add that the city is prior in
the order of nature to the family and the individual.
The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily
prior to the part. If the whole body is destroyed, there
will not be a foot or a hand, except in the ambiguous
sense in which one uses the same word to indicate a
different thing, as when one speaks of a ‘hand’ made
of stone; for a hand when destroyed will be no better
than a stone ‘hand.’ All things derive their essential
character from their function and their capacity, and
it follows that if they are no longer fit to discharge
their function [because no longer part of a functioning
whole], we ought not to say that they are still the
same things, but only that, by an ambiguity, they still
have the same names. (Politics I.2, 1253a18–25)
This general principle certainly has plausibility if
we consider an artifact such as a clock. The func-
tion of any part of the clock is derivative from
the function the clock as a whole is supposed to
perform. The goal of each part is to contribute
instrumentally or constitutively to the clock’s
purpose of telling the time. The function of the
whole is prior to that of the part, not derived
from the function of a part, as Wakefield claims.
The second claim (2) makes an incorrect attri-
bution concerning the definition of function as a
part that contributes to the life cycle changes of a
good member of the species. Elsewhere Wakefield
inconsistently attributes the (different) claim that
“human function is itself defined as whatever it
is about human nature that leads to a good
human life” (Wakefield 2000, 29). In fact I do
not stipulate either of these definitions since I do
not define function by reference to parts. These
claims may turn out to be true given the defini-
tion of function that is given and an investigation
of human nature, but they are not true by defini-
tion. I shall turn to my actual definition in due
course.
It is not clear that Wakefield’s third attribution
(3) follows, even were he not incorrect in the first
two attributions. At least two errors seem clear.
First, he seems to think he can infer something
about the content of the function of the whole
organism from a definition of the function of a
part. This error does depend on the misattributions.
First I do not begin by defining function by
reference to parts, so that cannot be the basis of
an inference to the function of the whole. Sec-
ond, as has now been made clear, the attributed
inference is exactly the opposite of the form of
inference permitted by the principle stating the
priority of wholes over parts given above. The
second error is that he seems to think that the
function of a whole is going to be the same kind
of thing as the function of a part. But it is not at
all clear this is the case. The function of a whole
is to do something, a clock tells the time; the
function of a part is to enable the whole to do
something, the hand of a clock rotates at a cer-
tain speed in order that it contributes optimally
to the clock’s telling the time. The function of the
whole determines what the parts are for, while
the functions of parts contribute to the achieve-
ment of that overall function (Charlton 1992,
120–21).
As a result, Wakefield’s concluding assertion,
the “definition [of the function of a part] trivially
implies that every organism has a function”
(2000, 23) is opposite to what my interpretation
of the function argument holds, which is that the
function of the whole human determines the func-
tion of parts of humans. Thus when Aristotle
claims that the function of a human is a fully
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rational life, he is not talking about the function
of a part, but the function of the whole that
determines the function of parts. If my interpre-
tation renders the function argument as wholly
nontrivial, what does it mean to claim that a
human being has a function? In answering this, it
will be possible to reiterate what exactly I do
take the Aristotelian definition of function to be.
The basic move in my interpretation was to
claim that a human being has a function in the
sense that any member of a natural kind has a
function. Aristotle’s argument locates human be-
ings within his general metaphysical account of
natural kinds and both that move and that picture
of the natural world are wholly nontrivial. Thus
in the previous paper, I asserted that in Aristotle’s
view, members of natural kinds have a subset of
potentialities that constitute their essence or na-
ture. For example, an acorn, or any member of the
oak species, should be thought of as, essentially, a
set of powers, ways of changing (acting on other
things or being acted upon), where this is a sub-
set of all the powers the acorn, or oak, has. Aristotle
clarifies what powers are in this subset by noting
that these essential properties (essential powers)
are those whose “realization [actualization] is open
to teleological explanation, and it is in this sense
that the natural kind has a function” (Megone
1998a, 193). In other words, to claim that a natu-
ral kind has a function is to claim that there are
aspects of its behavior that reveal its essence, and
those aspects are open to teleological explanation.
Given the derivative nature of the functions of
parts, parts of a natural kind have functions insofar
as at least some of the behavior of parts can be
explained teleologically as contributing to the func-
tion of the whole. Thus the favored account of the
function of a thing is that the function is that aspect
of a thing’s behavior (whether the thing be a whole
or a part) that is open to teleological explanation.
Comparison with an artifact may help again.
An artifact, a bed or a knife, say, has a function
in the sense that there is some goal or purpose
that the designer (or sometimes the user) has
given it. This goal is the designer’s aim in making
it and aspects of a knife, or its behavior, or the
behavior of its parts, can be explained teleologi-
cally by citing this goal. For example, a knife’s
being sharp can be explained teleologically in
terms of the goal of cutting. It is just this feature,
the possibility of explaining a thing’s behavior in
terms of a goal, that Aristotle transfers to the
case of natural kinds to justify the use of the term
function there. He admits that appeal cannot be
made to the goal of a designer as is made in the
case of artifacts (Physics II.8, 199b27–30), but
he argues that nonetheless goal-based explana-
tion is applicable to nature, and in that sense
members of natural kinds have functions. Thus
the sense in which both artifacts and members of
natural kinds (and the parts of each) have func-
tions is just that some aspects of the behavior of
(both parts and wholes of) each is teleologically
explicable. This makes clear that on this inter-
pretation, with this account of function, the Ar-
istotelian argument that humans have a function
is not at all trivial, since Aristotle was well aware
of the need to argue carefully for the claim that
some of the behavior of natural kinds requires
teleological explanation. Just as nowadays, there
were in Aristotle’s time materialists who denied
this claim and Aristotle addresses a number of
arguments to their position (Physics II.8–9).
Furthermore this link between the function of
a member of a natural kind and teleological
explanation makes clear that any Aristotelian
account of function must be (in modern terms)
evaluatively laden. As Cooper writes: “Aristotle
believed that many (not, of course, all) natural
events and facts need to be explained by refer-
ence to natural goals. He understands by a goal
(hou heneka), whether natural or not, something
good (from some point of view) that something
else causes or makes possible, where the other
thing exists or happens (at least in part) because of
that good” (1982, 197).3 Given this link between
function goal and value, it will be clear that,
contrary to Wakefield’s supposition, an Aristote-
lian account can give little support to a non-
evaluative account of function (Wakefield 2000).
What of Wakefield’s other objections? His sec-
ond objection is that my account provides no
basis for the claim that the life of a fully rational
animal is the function of a human being. In fact,
I give some attention to this point in my earlier
paper, and the suggestion I made there is not that
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attributed by Wakefield (“Megone embraces this
argument . . . without further analysis” [2000,
24]), that Aristotle argues by elimination.4 Noting
Aristotle’s claim that the relevant changes (con-
stitutive of natural function) “come to be always or
for the most part,” I point out that “Aristotle is
thinking of that regular cycle of changes which
contribute to the reproduction of the species and
thus to its persistence.” I also note that “Aristotle
arrives at this account of the changes that can be
explained as the functions of members of kinds
by reflection on experience” (Megone 1998a,
193ff.). It may help to elaborate this suggestion a
little further here.
The idea is that the identification of the behav-
ior that constitutes the function of a human being
presupposes careful and detailed observation of
human behavior, so as to be in a position to identify
which aspects of the observed behavior contribute
to that regular cycle that both ensures and con-
stitutes the persistence of the species. The identi-
fication of this cycle is not something that is itself
observable, given in the data. It requires reflective
judgment on the observed data. In the human
case, this judgment is particularly difficult. Since
humans are the most complex species, the behavior
contributing to the regular cycle is correspond-
ingly complex. Furthermore, as Aristotle observes,
humans are a gregarious species so their behavior
involves shared projects (a point elaborated be-
low), which adds to the complexity of identify-
ing the relevant cyclical behavior of individuals.
Thus when Aristotle claims that the human
function is a fully rational life, he means by this
claim to identify a whole cycle of behavior con-
stituting a life. As has been indicated, it is a claim
arrived at by reflecting on the range of human
behavior we can observe, judging what aspects
of the behavior contribute to the regular cycle
that is optimal for the persistence of the species
and then analyzing the fundamental nature of
such a life. In talking of a rational life, he is
identifying the function of the whole organism
and its function is revealed in a whole life. (This
conflicts with Wakefield’s view that the life of
reason is the function of a part [2000].)
Furthermore, in characterizing the human func-
tion in these terms, Aristotle must have in mind a
pre-theoretical notion of rationality that is in
principle of sufficient richness to characterize the
whole complex cycle of a good human life, but
whose elaboration is to be achieved by reflection
on the wide variety of human behavior that can
be observed, from which the nature of that rel-
evant cycle is to be extracted. Part of assessing
both what rationality involves and whether ra-
tionality is the appropriate concept to character-
ize the function of a human being qua human
being is reflectively assessing whether those fea-
tures that cyclically contribute to the persistence
and reproduction of the human species are in-
deed part of a fully rational life. In assessing
possible components of such a life, it should be
noted that some features may be part of the fully
rational life in that they are necessary develop-
ments if a human is to become fully rational,
while others may be features that are constitutive
of rational action and thought.
It follows from this that Wakefield is wrong to
suppose there is a conflict between the life of
reason and “many features . . .  that are develop-
mentally generated as an intrinsic part of the
human life cycle and that characteristically con-
tribute to a reproductively successful human life.
. . . for example, empathy with others, the sense
of justice, complex social emotions like honor
and pride and envy, capacity for language . . . ”
(2000, 24). These are not competitors to count
as the function of a human. On the contrary,
these are clearly what Aristotle has in mind in
NE and Politics as part of what a suitably rich
conception of the fully rational life will include.
In sum, Aristotle tells us quite enough to make
clear how one can set about determining what
the human function is. A grasp of this method
helps to clarify what is meant by his claim that
the human function is a fully rational life (the life
of a fully rational animal). In particular it makes
clear that this claim can be understood only if it
is recognized that he has in mind a very rich
conception of rationality exhibited by a language-
speaking, emotionally complex, virtuous, social
animal (and an animal also exhibiting the traits
of theoretical rationality).
Two further points need to be made in elabo-
rating how, on this account, Aristotle identifies
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the human function. First note two general as-
sumptions that Aristotle makes regarding the
natural world. Aristotle assumes that the natural
world is a stable persisting ecosystem (Cooper
1982, 202–5). Second he must suppose that un-
derstanding at least some of the behavior of
natural kinds as teleologically explicable, involves
grasping that a stable ecosystem in which species
persist is simply better than a degenerative chaotic
system. Presumably this judgment is buttressed
by pre-theoretical ordinary beliefs, still widely
held, as to how good plants or good animals will
develop (Megone 1998a, 193–94). The second
point lies at the heart of the way in which the
Aristotelian approach to illness conflicts with
both that of Szasz and that of Wakefield. The
account of how Aristotle identifies the human
function is indicative, at least, of one striking
way in which the Aristotelian account of the
natural world fuses facts and values (at least
values of one sort). As was explained in my
previous paper, the potentialities that are real-
ized (actualized) when a member of a natural
kind fulfills its function also constitute the essen-
tial potentialities of members of that kind. Thus
that cycle of changes that constitutes the func-
tion of the human being as a whole (and the basis
for determining the functions of parts) also de-
termines what a human being is. As a result,
making the supposedly evaluative judgment as to
what constitutes an ill or healthy human being is
the very same thing as making the supposedly
factual judgment as to what constitutes a human
being. The judgments are the same. There is no
separation of fact and value.
For this reason, Wakefield’s assertions that
my view “implies that to call a condition a medi-
cal disorder is merely or primarily to make a
value judgment and not to make a scientific or
factual judgment” (Wakefield 2000, 28) and that
on my account, “judgments about what are func-
tions and failures of function are essentially value
judgments” (41) are quite wrong. These judg-
ments about functions are both factual judg-
ments and value judgments, insofar as that ter-
minology is applicable to Aristotle. By the same
token, Wakefield is wrong when he supposes
that the Aristotelian account involves deriving
“the value component from the factual repro-
ductive component in [the] analysis of function”
(2000, 33). There are not distinct facts and val-
ues here. Wakefield, like Szasz, helps himself to
the presupposition that facts and values are clearly
and necessarily distinct. Though common, that
supposition is highly controversial, and it is not
applicable to Aristotle’s conception of the natu-
ral world.
There is a final point to make about the identi-
fication of the human natural function. Wakefield
himself attributes to Aristotle the view that the
fully rational life is the human function but sup-
poses this can be done by “supplementing” the
natural kind interpretation of the function argu-
ment (2000, 25–28). Some of the remarks al-
ready made should have indicated how the natu-
ral kind view might identify rationality as the
human function. However, it should be noted
that the natural kind interpretation can also ac-
cept the connection between a rational life and
life in a polis. Aristotle’s remarks on the subordi-
nation of ethics to political science (NE I.1–2,
X.9), and his claims that man is by nature a
social animal and that the state is natural (Poli-
tics I.1–3, 1253a2–5), need to be understood as
asserting that the teleologically explicable as-
pects of human nature can only be fully realized
(actualized) in a community. This is also what
Aristotle has in mind in characterizing humans
as biologically/politically gregarious animals
(Megone 1996; 1998c). Wakefield is correct about
the connection between reason and community
but wrong to think it undermines the natural
kind interpretation.
Wakefield’s two less serious objections remain
to be addressed. First there is the claim that the
natural kind interpretation of the argument does
not do justice to those aspects of the argument
that do not refer to natural kinds. There are
three relevant remarks. Two have been dealt with.
Aristotle’s first point concerning flute players
and sculptors (NE I.7, 1097b25) introduces a
general claim relating the function of a thing to
what is good for it. Such a general claim can then
be extended to natural kinds, which is what the
function argument as a whole aims to achieve.
So this first remark can be satisfactorily accounted
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for. The two other remarks express reasons why
a human being as such might be thought to have
a function (NE I.7, 1097b28–32). The claim
based on the fact that parts of the body are
agreed to have functions has been discussed. It
has argumentative force given the suppressed
premise that the functions of wholes are prior to
the functions of parts, so that parts only have
functions if the whole to which they belong has a
function. But what is to be made of the third
comment, to the effect that if carpenters and
tanners have functions, then so also must human
beings? Wakefield is right to suggest that all the
remarks not about natural kinds should be ac-
commodated by a plausible account of the argu-
ment as a whole, so this remark too should make
a contribution to the argument. However, his
own suggestion here is not plausible. He takes
the point that professions (nonnatural kinds) have
socially determined goals (which define them) to
support the view that a natural kind such as
human being should have the function of a ratio-
nal life, where the concept of reason is under-
stood socially (that is as a capacity realized in a
community). This is a non sequitur.
However, the passages Wakefield cites in dis-
cussing this remark are helpful to understanding
Aristotle’s point here (NE I.1, 1094a8–17; I.2,
1094a25ff.). In these passages, Aristotle is argu-
ing that while activities like those of carpenter
and tanner are widely believed to have goals
(functions), their goals are not goods in them-
selves. Tables and shoes are desirable for the sake
of some further end, means to a further goal.
Thus their functions, or goals, are dependent on
there being some further goal (at least one) that
is a good in itself. His implicit suggestion in this
remark is that if humans qua humans had a
function or goal, that would be a suitable end in
itself toward which the goals of socially defined
activities, such as carpentry, might lead. In the
earlier passages, he intimates that it is the role of
political science to investigate this goal (which is
consistent with our observation above that the
human good or function, the fully rational life, is
realized in a polis). This argument for the exist-
ence of a function for humans qua humans is
exactly parallel to the argument that the goals of
parts of the body are subordinate to the goal of
the human being as a whole. Thus here all the
goals of subordinate artificially defined activities
are subordinate to the function of humans as
such. This reference to socially defined activities
does then provide a further reason for supposing
that humans as such have a function. But the
form of the reasoning here does nothing to un-
dermine the natural kind interpretation of the
function argument.
Finally, Wakefield’s fourth objection is that
the natural kind interpretation renders the func-
tion argument unhelpfully circular in an investi-
gation of the human good. For, he suggests, ana-
lyzing the function of a human being in terms of
some goal or purpose that teleologically explains
certain behavior makes the argument circular
since we have to appeal to the notion of the good
human in order to specify what behavior is func-
tionally explicable (Wakefield 2000, 28–29).
What is correct here is that Aristotle is not argu-
ing in favor of identifying the human function
first, so that the human good may be determined
on that basis (as Wakefield seems to think he is).
The human function is that aspect of human
behavior that is teleologically explicable, and the
concept of the good human is relevant to identifying
the teleologically explicable behavior (Megone
1998a, 193). However, Aristotle does not present
us with a trivial circle, in which the human func-
tion just is what the good human does, and the
good human just is one who performs the human
function. Rather than this, Aristotle’s suggestion
that the human function might cast light on the
human good introduces to an investigation of
what is good for a human a much larger picture
of the natural world as teleologically explicable.
With this much larger picture comes a corre-
sponding understanding of the role of a good
member of the species in that world, which can
be used to identify concretely which aspects of
human behavior a good human would perform.
Each of these conceptions, the teleological con-
ception of the natural world and the conception
of the good human, is developed in tandem; and
each must also be sensitive to a range of other
theoretical beliefs (in the case of the natural
world, beliefs about natural kinds; in the case of
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the human good, other beliefs about what is
good for humans, such as beliefs about human
psychology and physiology, and about the vir-
tues). The argument may suggest that certain
concepts need to be understood together, but not
in any manner that is viciously circular.
In this way, the natural kind interpretation of
Aristotle’s function argument can be defended
against Wakefield’s criticisms. The basic idea we
are left with then is that human beings, like mem-
bers of other natural kinds, have a function in the
sense that some of their behavior, but not all, is
teleologically explicable, that is, can be understood
as achieving some natural goal or purpose, some-
thing that is, from some point of view, good.
Such an account of the human function is neces-
sarily evaluative, but it is also necessarily factual
since it is tied to what a human being essentially
is. Aristotle claims that the human function is,
within this account, the life of the fully rational
animal. Illness is any incapacitating failure to
realize (actualize) this human function.
A Non-evaluative Account of
Function?
Although the Aristotelian evaluative account
of human function, and the corresponding analy-
sis of illness or disease, remains intact, it is worth
considering the merits of Wakefield’s suggestion
that the concept of human function can be ana-
lyzed non-evaluatively. What has already been
shown, though, is that Aristotle’s texts will not
provide support for such an analysis.
Wakefield characterizes his claim as the view
that function and dysfunction are factual con-
cepts (Wakefield 2000). Three stages in the de-
fense of this position will be considered. First of
all, Wakefield suggests that there are examples of
failures of function that are not harmful, indicat-
ing that a purely factual understanding of the
concept is desirable. Second, he argues that there
is an alternative account of function within which
functional behavior can be seen as teleologically
explicable behavior, but teleological explanation
itself can be reduced to a special kind of cause/
effect explanation and thus need not require any
normative framework. Third, he argues that such
a factual understanding of function is supported
by an analysis of its role in an evolutionary
account of natural kinds.
It is worth noting first the way that Wakefield sets
up this part of the debate. He claims that I “assume
that the value account of function is correct,
based on [my] view that past attempts to analyze
function entirely in non-evaluative scientific terms
have failed” (Wakefield 2000, 28). Wakefield’s
claim about my motivation here is mistaken. The
claim is partly true in that I do take it to be
relevant that previous attempts at non-evaluative
accounts of function have failed, a point made
by Fulford (Fulford 1991, 84, 98). However, I
also emphasized that the ordinary concepts of
illness and disease are clearly evaluative notions,
so that it will be an advantage for a functional
account of these concepts if the concept of func-
tion is itself evaluative (Megone 1998a, 191).
But a second point about Wakefield’s remark
depends on noting again the assumptions he is
making here. As noted above, he assumes that
there is an essential contrast between facts and
values and thus that any scientific account of
illness must be factual and therefore not evalua-
tive. As has also been indicated, though, the
Aristotelian account does not share this fact–
value distinction or, therefore, this view of a
scientific analysis of the natural world. Facts and
values are fused in the natural world, so that an
evaluative account of function may also be a
factual account, and such an account may thus
be thoroughly scientific. The evaluative account
of function, and corresponding account of ill-
ness, does not provide an evaluative account
rather than a scientific account. It reveals the
way in which a scientific account of illness in-
volves a judgment that is at one and the same
time both factual and evaluative. Thus Wakefield’s
view, that he needs a non-evaluative account of
function to preserve the scientific status of the
concept, is mistaken.
Wakefield supposes, then, that I, like many
others (e.g., Sadler and Agich 1995), simply as-
sume that function and dysfunction are prima-
rily evaluative concepts. What has been said so
far in reply is that there are good pre-theoretical
reasons to seek such an account, and that there
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are theoretical reasons why any such account
will not give rise to unscientific concepts. This
already rebuts the thought that a mere assump-
tion was being made. In any case, though, the
underlying thought in fact arises from reflection
on the function of artifacts, where the term has
its primary application. An artifact like a knife
can do many things in the sense that it can be
used to bang a table, hammer a nail, smash a
glass, complement a fork, and so on. These are
all powers or potentialities of a knife. What de-
termines what potential must be realized if the
knife is to perform its function, as opposed to
one of the many other things it can do? The
answer is that its function is given by its designer,
and that is the goal, or good, that the designer
aims at in designing the knife. Reference to the
good, as perceived by the designer, is essential in
picking out the function of an artifact. Corre-
spondingly when we explain why a certain imple-
ment is being used on the bread, by citing the
purpose of cutting, we are providing a teleological
explanation of the activity in which the function of
that implement figures as the good that the de-
signer/user aims at in this use. If the case of artifacts
is taken as a starting point for an understanding
of function, it is clear that an evaluative account
of the concept falls naturally out of the analysis.
As a result, when the language of function is
transferred to the case of members of natural
kinds and their parts, it is reasonable to expect
the same analysis. Eyes and feet and hearts can
each figure (or rather their activities can so fig-
ure) in the production of a wide range of effects.
If so, why is it the function of eyes to see or of
hearts to pump the blood? The parallel with
artifacts (a parallel that Aristotle also exploits, as
noted, [Physics, II.8–9]) suggests that these par-
ticular effects, produced by the operation of eyes
and hearts in certain circumstances, only consti-
tute their function because there is at least some
perspective from which these activities can be
seen as good, thus a goal of the organ in ques-
tion. Thus I did not hold that the function of a
heart must contribute to reproduction (or that
function means “characteristically contributes to
reproduction”), as Wakefield reports (2000, 29).
The fundamental idea is that the heart’s function
must be a goal, good from some perspective, and
pumping the blood can be seen as achieving a
goal if that activity contributes to the persistence
of the species, and that in turn is, from some
perspective, good. I suggested that the sense in
which all this is good is given if we recognize that
a stable, ordered, persisting ecosystem is better
than a chaotic, degenerating ecological environ-
ment (Megone 1998a, 194). All this is consistent
with the claim made earlier that fundamentally
the function of a thing is that aspect of the thing’s
behavior (whether the thing be a whole or a part)
that is open to teleological explanation. What is
being brought out here is the way in which that
analysis, starting in a natural way from consider-
ation of artifacts, gives rise to the view that
function is an evaluative concept. This confirms
that the treatment of function as an evaluative
notion was a matter of analysis, not simply an
assumption.
Even if not merely assumed, the evaluative
account of function may be mistaken. Wakefield
argues that it is. He claims first that the perspec-
tive referred to above, in which a stable, ordered,
persisting ecosystem is seen as good, cannot in
fact explain why certain activities of natural kinds
and their parts constitute the functions of those
things. To support this, he asserts that: the parts
of viruses would still “require functional expla-
nation” even from those who think it better that
such viruses cease to exist; “the parts of a human
being would still have functional explanations”
even if it were better if the human race had never
existed; and the parts of an organism that is
designed to destroy ecosystems would be “just as
much candidates for functional explanation as
those of the most ecologically benign organism”
(Wakefield 2000, 30). However, he gives no ex-
planation for this assertion. The evaluative ac-
count of function only holds that if the activity
of a member of a natural kind, or of its part, is to
be open to functional explanation, there must be
some perspective from which that activity is seen
as good. Only from that perspective is the behav-
ior functionally explicable. Of course functional
explanation of the behavior of parts will be pos-
sible in the cases above if it is said, for example,
that the survival of the virus, or of humans, or of
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the corrupt organism, is good in the sense that it is
good, in each case, for that kind itself, or good from
the perspective of genetic diversity. (Wakefield
queries whether it makes sense to talk in the first
way about what is good for a virus) (2000, 32).
Presumably we can make some sense of a preda-
tor being bad for a species because it threatens
the survival of the species. But in any case, here
no commitment is made to this being a coherent
perspective.) There will often be a range of per-
spectives on the value of some activity. The point
is that functional explanation will be possible to
the extent that there is some perspective from
which it has positive value.
Of course if in the end, it is held that any or all
of these perspectives are mere perspectives, that
there is no genuine overall good served by the
relevant activities, then such explanation will be
mere “as if” teleology. There will not, on such a
view, be genuine functional explanations. Talk of
the function of natural kinds or their parts will
be merely a way we have of thinking about the
world (Ackrill 1982; Wieland 1975).
Wakefield’s mere assertion that it will still be
possible to give functional explanation of the
activity of parts in the cases he mentions leaves it
unclear whether he thinks that such explanations
are merely ‘as if’ teleology, or whether he thinks
there are other goals (other than a stable eco-
system) that are from some perspective genuinely
good, and which these activities serve. If he holds
neither of these views his claim that functional
explanation is possible, even if the survival of a
species is a bad thing, is a mere assertion.
Compare a clock. If we learn that an artifact
we had supposed to have the function of telling
the time was not made by its designer to achieve
that goal, then it is no longer the case that the
hands have the function of showing the time, at
least unless there is some other perspective of the
designer’s from which such activity is good. If we
learn that there is no perspective from which the
behavior of the artifact is good from the point of
view of the designer (or user), this undermines
the claim that the parts have any function.5 So
the claim that the activity of an organism consti-
tutes the function of an organism requires only
that the activity be good from some perspective.
Sensitivity to this nuance explains why Wakefield’s
supposed counter-examples appear to have any
plausibility (2000, 19, 30–32). The examples
trade on the reader viewing them from such
perspective. But in fact, what Wakefield needs is
the claim that the parts’ behavior will clearly be
functionally explicable even if no such perspec-
tive is possible. No argument is given for such a
claim in any of the cases given.
This can be illustrated with reference to just
one of the examples given. Wakefield picks out
the thesis that social welfare policy has the func-
tion of controlling the poor rather than of help-
ing them (2000, 32). He argues that this shows
that functional explanation need not be evalua-
tive since this is, he claims, a perfectly valid
functional explanation; yet, none of the authors
who offer such a functional explanation of social
welfare policy think that it is a good thing that
the poor are controlled in this way. But the evalu-
ative account of functional/teleological explana-
tion holds only that if some activity is function-
ally explicable, that activity must be so explicable
by reference to a goal that is, from some point of
view, good. In this case, social welfare policy is
functionally explicable in virtue of a goal that is
(according to a certain theory) good from the
perspective of the upper classes. There is no re-
quirement that one who cites such an explana-
tion endorse that perspective. However, Wakefield
trades on the fact that the reader accepts the
availability of that perspective in order to make
it plausible that functional explanation is pos-
sible here. Were no such perspective possible,
social welfare policy would not be functionally
explicable.
Quite generally, one who cites a functional
explanation alludes to the existence of a relevant
evaluative perspective but need not endorse it.
Similarly, to accept that an activity is function-
ally explicable by reference to a goal that is good
from some perspective is not to commit the theo-
rist to the view that the goal is all things consid-
ered good, or exceptionlessly good.6 As has been
said, sensitivity to this nuanced account allows
all Wakefield’s purported counter-examples to
an evaluative account of function to be handled
in ways similar to that above.
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However, Wakefield has a theoretical objec-
tion that goes beyond this appeal to purported
counter-examples. He claims that “the addition
of such a value component does not warrant
teleological explanation. The eyes have the effect
of seeing, and seeing is characteristic of a human
life that leads to reproduction, and we value the
good life of which seeing and reproduction are a
part, but these facts together do not contain a
distinctive teleological element. . . . Nothing in
this combination of facts and values warrants
teleological explanation. So the basic problem is
this: When a feature causes a valued effect, that
is still just standard efficient causation plus a
value judgment about the effect. It is not a dis-
tinctive form of teleological explanation in which
the effect can be used to explain the feature.”
Wakefield then proposes an alternative:
Rather than holding that a mechanism’s effect is a
function and can be used to teleologically explain the
mechanism when we value the effect, one can hold
that the effect is a function when it must be cited in a
causal explanation of the mechanism, as in an expla-
nation by natural selection in which the effect of a
mechanism explains why [it] exists and is maintained
in the species and why it is structured the way it is.
Note that such explanations are merely an unusual
form of efficient causal explanation. Thus, this analy-
sis dissolves the central mystery about teleological
explanations; namely, why do they explain anything?
Citing a valued effect does not offer any explanation
whatever of a mechanism, but citing an effect that
played a role in the causal sequence leading to the
mechanism is clearly explanatory in a sense with which
we are familiar. (2000, 31)
Such a long quote is necessary both because this
passage lies at the heart of Wakefield’s defense of a
non-evaluative account of function and because the
passage is rather curious. Does Wakefield have any
argument here for the view that explaining the
behavior of some whole or part by reference to the
goal of that activity is not a genuine, teleological
explanation? There are at least four problems
with what appears to be the line of argument.
Perhaps the most fundamental of these prob-
lems is to be found toward the end of the passage.
Wakefield seems implicitly to hold a theory of
explanation according to which only cause and
effect explanations are genuinely explanatory (at
least of mechanical behavior). The holding of
such a theory would also account for another
rather curious remark: “If the value theorist con-
cedes that an explanatory component is essential
to the meaning of function . . . ” (Wakefield
2000, 33). This is an odd remark since the value
theorist sees the function of a structure as its
teleologically explicable behavior, so such a re-
mark could only make any sense to someone
who supposes that explanation citing valued ob-
jectives is not genuine explanation and that only
cause and effect explanation is genuinely ex-
planatory. But Wakefield gives absolutely no ar-
gument for this idiosyncratic view of explana-
tion. In his analysis of the nature of explanation,
Aristotle provides us with four different explana-
tory modes, formal, material, agent–patient
(which is not in fact quite the same as the Humean
cause–effect mode, and may have advantages
over it), and teleological (Physics II.3, 194b16–
195a4). These are four quite distinct schema,
each of which provides an irreducibly different
mode of understanding of the world. Formal,
material, and teleological are not reducible to
agent–patient explanation, but nonetheless they
are required for a full understanding of the world.
The formal explanation for a figure’s being a
square, that it has four equal sides and four right
angles, is genuinely explanatory but not reduc-
ible to cause–effect explanation. The material
explanation for a statue’s being heavy, that it is
made of gold, is genuinely explanatory, but not
reducible to cause–effect explanation. So, finally,
the teleological explanation for a knife’s being
sharp, that it is for cutting, or for a fish’s having
fins, that they are for swimming, is genuinely
explanatory but not reducible to cause and effect
explanation.
Wakefield seems to provide no argument for
rejecting the explanatory power of these distinct
modes of explanation. He simply asserts it. Yet on
the face of it, only such a belief can make sense of
his denial that to explain the existence or behav-
ior of eyes by reference to seeing, where vision is
conceived as a goal, from some perspective good,
is to provide a genuine teleological explanation.
More than assertion is required to support such
a denial. For it is very odd to think that this
60  PPP / VOL. 7, NO. 1 / MARCH 2000
mode of explanation can only be genuinely ex-
planatory if it can somehow be reduced to cause–
effect explanation.
In fact, teleological explanation provides a
further level of understanding of the world over
and above cause–effect explanation. In some
cases, in addition to being able to explain how it
comes about that an agent is engaged in the
activity of seeing, by citing the causal chain that
is bringing about that activity, it will also be
possible to explain that activity as being (or
producing) a goal, good from some perspective.
Once such a teleological explanation is grasped,
it will be possible to understand not just how an
activity has come about but also that, since the
activity has come about, things are, from some
perspective, going well (or badly, if the activity
constitutes a failure of a goal to come about).
This is a distinct mode of understanding of the
world. Obviously it is particularly important in
the field of medicine since it is crucial to know
not just how a condition has come about but
whether that condition’s coming about consti-
tutes things going well (health) or badly (illness)
for the organism. Only in the light of the under-
standing given by this teleological mode of ex-
planation is it possible to determine whether
medical intervention is or is not necessary. In
other spheres, such as mathematics, the teleo-
logical mode of explanation may not be appli-
cable (just as the cause–effect mode may not be).
So there is every reason to think teleological
explanation is genuinely explanatory, even if not
reducible to efficient causal explanation. If so,
Wakefield’s apparently suppressed general view
of explanation can be rejected.
Two further problems in the passage outlined
above now follow. First, Wakefield’s attempt to
cite the evolutionary account of natural selection
in support of his view seems questionable. Sec-
ond, his positive alternative account of teleologi-
cal explanation is open to doubt. On Wakefield’s
view within evolutionary theory, the claim that
the heart has a natural function (pumping the
blood) should be seen as specifying the special
causal role of the heart’s pumping of the blood.
This suggestion can be addressed directly. How-
ever, it is at least as plausible to view evolution-
ary theory differently. The theory is not whole-
heartedly teleological in that it supposes that the
actual occurrence of entities belonging to species
that will successfully survive is to be explained
through the chance interaction of physical enti-
ties. However, once a member of a species exists,
if within evolutionary theory, parts of that or-
ganism are said to have a natural function, a
natural construal of this claim is that the behav-
ior of those parts can be explained in a way that
is irreducibly teleological. That is, when evolu-
tionary theory holds that hearts exist for the
purpose of the pumping of the blood, it implic-
itly treats survival of the species as a goal, from
some perspective good, and thus treats pumping
of the blood as a derivative goal, derivatively
good from that perspective. (This point has at
least been raised by Agich and Sadler in discuss-
ing Wakefield’s position (Agich and Sadler 1995,
224–27).
In any case, one can question whether Wakefield’s
proposed alternative account of teleological ex-
planation applies satisfactorily either to this case
or to the functional/teleological explanation of
artifacts. According to Wakefield, a teleological
explanation is provided when there is a causal
explanation of an effect and the effect is itself the
cause of the existence of the mechanism that causes
it. In this case, “the effect is a function” (Wakefield
2000, 31). The first problem with this account of
teleological explanation is that it loses any sense
in which this is explanation by reference to a
telos, or goal or purpose, so it is unclear why it is
thought to be teleological.
The second difficulty is that it is very doubtful
that this structure can be made to apply to either
biological or artifact cases. According to Wakefield,
on this model “the heart exists for the purpose of
pumping the blood in the sense that the fact that
past hearts had this effect causally explains how
hearts came to exist and be maintained in the
species and the genesis of the heart’s detailed
structure” (2000, 31). The most basic difficulty
here is that past hearts’ pumping the blood figure
in all sorts of causal stories, stories in which
agents die young, or agents do not reproduce, or
agents reproduce but defectively, and so on. It is
not the case that hearts pumping the blood have
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simply caused hearts to exist. So hearts pumping
the blood does not causally explain how hearts
came to exist. This cannot therefore be the sense
in which the pumping of the blood is a function-
ally explicable activity of the heart.
The best that might be said is that there is one
causal chain, out of the myriad causal chains in
which the heart’s pumping figures, in which,
along with the operation of the rest of the body,
does cause another heart to exist. But it is plau-
sible that the only way to distinguish this causal
chain from all the myriad others is to say that
this is the chain in which the heart’s pumping
achieves its goal, survival of the species, which
makes the pumping here thus derivatively good.
The relevant causal chain is the one in which the
pumping is teleologically explicable in the goal-
based sense. In other words, this approach is led
back to the teleological mode of explanation in
the standard Aristotelian sense. The problem of
applying Wakefield’s suggestion to the artifact
case is worse still. According to the suggestion,
cutting is the teleologically explicable activity of
a knife in the sense that the effect, cutting, “was
anticipated in the [mind] of the [designer] and
played a causal role in how [he] designed the
artifact” (Wakefield 2000, 31). The difficulty is
that here it is not the effect, cutting, that plays
any causal role in the design of the artifact. What
may play a causal role (though even that is dis-
puted) is the designer’s desire for a cutting imple-
ment. But in any case, that desire for a cutting
implement once again figures in all sorts of causal
stories, stories in which the agent does intend to
produce a knife, or does not, and does, or does
not, achieve his intention. The desire for a cut-
ting implement does not simply cause a cutting
implement to exist. This cannot therefore be the
sense in which cutting is a functionally expli-
cable use of a knife.
There is (at least) one causal chain, out of
many in which it figures, where this result, cut-
ting, does occur. However, again it is plausible
that in order to pick out this chain (or these
chains) as the one that is relevant to its func-
tional role, it will be necessary to specify this as
the chain that brings about the goal of the desire
(which the designer thought of as good). Once
again the standard Aristotelian account of teleo-
logical explanation must be appealed to in order
to rescue the supposed alternative account.
In sum, Wakefield admits that functionally
explicable activity of a whole or a part is teleo-
logically explicable activity. However, he cannot
produce plausible examples of teleologically ex-
plicable activity that is not, from some perspec-
tive good. Nor can he produce a satisfactorily
non-evaluative account of teleological explana-
tion. So he cannot find any support here for a
non-evaluative account of the concept of func-
tion.
The discussion has also identified a potential
underlying problem. Wakefield’s efforts to pro-
duce a non-evaluative account of function seem
driven by a mistaken set of interrelated supposi-
tions: that there is a sharp fact/value distinction;
that science is concerned only with facts; that a
genuinely scientific (and genuinely explanatory)
explanation of the world must therefore be purely
factual; and that cause and effect explanation
constitutes such a mode of explanation. In re-
sponse to this set of suppositions, the Aristote-
lian approach presents a picture of the natural
world in which facts and values are fused, and
thus a correspondingly richer account of modes
of explanation, within which to locate an evalua-
tive account of the concept of function and cor-
responding function based account of illness.
Wakefield’s account of illness concedes that
both functional norms and values are relevant to
an adequate account of the concept. In a similar
way, Szasz, too, has conceded a role for both the
notion of function and that of value. To this
extent, both provide support for an account of
the concept in terms of an evaluatively under-
stood concept of function. The failure of Szasz to
provide an alternative source for functional norms
to that given in the Aristotelian account and the
failure of Wakefield to provide a non-evaluative
alternative to the evaluative account of function
leave the Aristotelian account as the best ac-
count, compatible with the points they have both
conceded, that is still in the field.
* * *
62  PPP / VOL. 7, NO. 1 / MARCH 2000
Practical Implications of the
Aristotelian Functional
Account of Mental Illness
The Aristotelian account of the function of
human beings may offer the beginnings of a
better understanding of mental illness. It is only
the beginning since, on this account, illness is an
incapacitating failure of a part of a human to act
as it must if the agent as a whole is to live a fully
rational life (strictly, the life of a fully rational
animal). This account is incomplete since it leaves
for further elaboration the question of what the
concept of rationality here involves, although
some indication of the nature of the conception
has been given and some concrete features have
been indicated.
However, Szasz reiterates in his response that
such a philosophical analysis is of no relevance
since it ignores the fact “that psychiatry is, in
effect, a branch of the law” (2000, 9). His objec-
tion appears to be that such an analysis is of no
practical use since it can have no positive effect
on the practices in which psychiatry is, in his
view, currently involved. This point has already
been addressed in a previous response, so I shall
be brief (Megone 1998b, 223).
Szasz elaborates this claim about psychiatry
by citing a number of recent cases in which
people have been, according to his report, abused
by psychiatrists. He claims that this illustrates
“the truth . . . that, in the United States alone,
each year hundreds of thousands of persons are
subjected to psychiatric coercions” (2000, 12).
In his view, these cases reflect the way in which
“[psychiatry’s] institutions and interventions le-
gitimize [coercive] relations between rulers and
ruled . . . ” (2000, 15). According to Szasz, I
imply “that [such] compulsion is rarely used in
psychiatry” (2000, 12), and my whole approach
fails to address the way in which psychiatry de-
ploys the mythical notion of mental illness in order
to legitimize an indefensible ideological political
order.
Szasz seems still not to appreciate that the
Aristotelian analysis of mental illness is intimately
concerned with the legitimacy of psychiatric prac-
tices. Such concern is not only manifested in
endorsements of Szasz’s own position. Whatever
one’s position on the matter, an understanding of
the nature of mental illness is an essential prereq-
uisite to both understanding and critically assess-
ing the social and legal practices governing the
treatment of the mentally ill. Viewing the issue
from a very general perspective, the difference in
the way in which mental and physical illnesses
incapacitate an agent in rational functioning
might be expected to distinguish the way in which
the mentally and the physically ill are treated.
Very roughly, physical illnesses incapacitate ra-
tional functioning by indirect attacks on the
agent’s rational powers, either preventing ratio-
nal choices being acted upon (too sick to run, for
example), or preventing receipt of the informa-
tion on which such choices depend. Mental ill-
nesses, on the other hand, incapacitate rational
functioning by direct attack on the agent’s ratio-
nal powers, preventing the agent from forming
rational beliefs on the basis of information or
from making rational choices in the light of de-
sires and beliefs. It will therefore not be surpris-
ing if the whole mode of treating the mentally ill,
incapacitated from making choices, for example,
differs from that of agents who, through physical
illness, are incapacitated from acting on choices.
This general picture thus tends to endorse the
practical implications of the Aristotelian perspec-
tive as against Szasz’s.
To avoid too much repetition, I will simply
summarize the differences between my approach
and Szasz’s.
1. In my paper, I was not analyzing any actual
cases to determine the legitimacy of coercion on
those occasions, and Szasz is quite wrong to con-
strue my claim that “[c]ompulsory treatment can
be justified at least for some patients” as in any way
implying that compulsion is rarely used in psy-
chiatry.
2. What that claim does assert is that compul-
sory psychiatric treatment can sometimes be jus-
tified. This is because, in my analysis, mental
illness is not a myth. On the contrary, mental
illness occurs when an agent is incapacitated
from rational belief formation or rational choice.
Coercion may be justified in such a case since a
patient who is ill in such a way lacks a basic
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requirement for the realization of autonomy.
Hence “compulsory treatment of mental illness,
rather than infringing autonomy, may in fact
facilitate its recovery” (Megone 1998a, 199).
3. This analysis does not hold that all psychi-
atric coercion is unjustifiable, yet it is also able to
explain the possible misuse of psychiatry. The
Aristotelian account of mental illness incorpo-
rates the notion of rationality, and, as has been
seen, this concept is, on that account, immensely
complex and difficult to spell out. It is this fact
and the association or practical rationality with
goals that “has made it possible (but not defen-
sible) for some highly disputable norms to be
imposed” (Megone 1998a, 199).
4. Such a position, while not endorsing Szasz’s
extreme view that mental illness is a myth, does
endorse the view that “caution is required in the
attribution of mental illness” (Megone 1998a, 199).
This point will be elaborated somewhat below.
5. This account of mental illness via a func-
tional analysis does not account for the phenom-
enon of illness in purely physico-chemical terms.
In the absence of such a reduction, “the possibil-
ity remains open that some illnesses, at least,
may not be best treated physico-chemically”
(Megone 1998a, 199). Thus wariness about drugs
treatment is vindicated, but the physical realiza-
tion of conditions constituting illnesses also leaves
it open that drugs could sometimes be of benefit.
One further point is worth emphasizing again.
It is a widely held pre-theoretical belief that men-
tal illness does occur. The possibility of explain-
ing practical phenomena associated with it with-
out being driven to denying its existence is a
theoretical advantage of the Aristotelian account
over Szasz’s position.
Developing the Aristotelian
Account
Considerable work remains to be done to de-
velop the Aristotelian account. The rich account
of rationality requires articulation in order to
identify with much more precision possible crite-
ria for identification of specific mental illnesses.
In fact, these projects are mutually compatible in
that proposed accounts of mental illnesses can be
drawn upon in order to advance proposals for a
deeper understanding of rationality and, at the
same time, proposals regarding rationality can
be used to clarify conceptions of mental illness.
This is a further clear indication of the way in
which work in philosophy and work in psychia-
try will be of great mutual benefit (and of the
way in which concepts can be clarified together
without circularity).
It will also be necessary to distinguish mental
illnesses from other conditions that lead to func-
tional failure. As was explained previously, lazi-
ness can lead to functional failure, just as mental
illness can (Megone 1998a, 196), and in Aristotle’s
account, moral vices will constitute irrationality,
as will schizophrenia. The theoretical distinction
between laziness, or any moral vice, and mental
illness is that the former is within the agent’s
power (hekon, in Aristotle’s terminology) while
the latter is an incapacitating failure (akon, in
Aristotle’s terminology) (NE, III.1–5; Hobbs
1998, 211–12). However, initially at least, the
epistemological criteria for distinguishing these
conditions or, in general, for distinguishing men-
tal illnesses from other conditions in which irra-
tionality is exhibited will be behavioral. It may
be that in due course there will in some cases be
support for the identification of some conditions
as indeed illnesses (incapacitating conditions)
from neurological evidence, but the present level
of neurological knowledge means this will tend
to be supportive, at best, at present.
The difficulties in making these distinctions
again seem perfectly compatible with widely held
pre-theoretical beliefs as to, for example, the
difficulties in determining whether some agents
of criminal activity should be deemed mentally
ill or judged responsible for their acts. Thus the
Aristotelian functional theory of mental illness
once again meets the theoretical criteria for a
good account.
Conclusion
Though the aim of this paper has been defen-
sive, it is to be hoped that the range of issues
raised by the forthright challenges from Wakefield,
Szasz, and previous commentators has made it
possible for its contribution to be positive as
well. In particular, this defense of the Aristote-
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lian response has served to highlight a number of
the key presuppositions that inform the accounts
of Wakefield and Szasz, on the one side, and
their Aristotelian challenger on the other. De-
spite their differences, both Szasz and Wakefield
appear to share a conception of science as an
empirical discipline concerned with the material
world. In this view, science is concerned with
facts, and facts are given in observation, and
what is observed is the material realm. There is a
sharp contrast between facts and values. Values
are not observable, nor material, and thus not
the concern of science. To the extent that illness
has anything to do with values, therefore, that
evaluative aspect of the concept has a non-scien-
tific source (though, as has been indicated, Szasz’s
position on this last matter is less clear). Two
further presuppositions are compatible with this
materialist empiricism. On the one hand, there is
Szasz’s Cartesian dualism about the mind, treat-
ing the mind as an immaterial substance and
thus perhaps beyond the concern of science. On
the other hand, there is Wakefield’s theory of
explanation that views only efficient causal ex-
planation found, he may suppose, in the material
realm, as the genuinely explanatory mode of
explanation to be given in science. Their ac-
counts of the concept of mental illness are built
on these presuppositions.
Contrary to this metaphysical scheme stands
the Aristotelian framework in which the scien-
tific investigation of the natural world is an in-
vestigation of a world in which facts and values
are fused. Correspondingly, the Aristotelian ac-
count rejects the fact/value distinction, rejects a
Cartesian substance dualism about the mind and
the body, and offers a much richer scheme of
genuinely explanatory modes of (scientific) ex-
planation that accords with the nature of the
natural substances that constitute the world that
science investigates. It is not surprising that an
Aristotelian account of illness, which is a facet of
a natural kind (in this case, human illness), should
therefore reflect this fusion of facts and values
and the important role of irreducible teleological
explanation within this metaphysical picture.
The discussion has also touched on underlying
issues concerning the nature of the meaning (or
definition) of concepts and on method in philo-
sophical inquiry. These are relevant to the devel-
opment of the metaphysical pictures needed to
understand the concept of mental illness. However,
I hope it has become clear that it is in the distinction
between the Aristotelian metaphysical picture and
that of its opponents that the contrast between
the different positions is sharpest and that there
is much to be said for the Aristotelian position.
Notes
1. Szasz’s position has been briefly addressed previ-
ously (Megone 1998b, 223), but the analysis that fol-
lows may make the rebuttal clear.
2. As a matter of fact the OED gives a definition of
illness as (1) disease, (2) the state of being ill (which
conforms with Szasz’s treatment of disease and illness
as interchangeable), and defines ill as out of health,
sick ( . . . mentally ill people), so Szasz does not receive
dictionary support here. But my aim is not to challenge
him on these grounds.
3. Cooper cites Physics II.2, 194a 32–33; II.3,
195a23–25; Politics I.2, 1252b34–35, and EE I.8,
1218b9–11 as among “the many passages where
Aristotle routinely explicates ‘that for the sake of which’
by linking it with the good, the fine, the better, etc. (cf.
MP 13, 983a31–2, PA 11 639b19–20). That the con-
cept of a goal is the concept of something good is a
view Aristotle inherited from Plato’s Phaedo (cf., for
example, 97C6–D3, E1–4, 98A6–B3, 99A7–C7)” (Coo-
per 1982, 197).
4. Wakefield seems simply to have overlooked or
ignored the fact that the question of how the function
of a kind is to be determined is specifically raised and
addressed in my first paper (Megone 1998a, 193ff).
5. The example would now become problematic if
one wondered whether it entailed an agent making
something to no purpose whatever (Anscombe, 1957).
Presumably the case would have to involve an agent
simply manipulating parts, the mechanical equivalent
of doodling, and thus the parts have no function.
6. For example, a certain activity may be good at
many times in the history of a species, but not at all
times; so it is not an exceptionless good.
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